Supervenience and reductionism by Kutschera, Franz
S U P E R V E N I E N C E A N D R E D U C T I O N I S M 
Materialism is a reductionistic position. It claims that in the last analysis 
all things and events are physical objects and events, that the language 
of physics is sufficient to express all empirical facts, or that "the world 
is as physics says it is, and there's no more to say". 1 For about 20 years, 
however, non-reductive versions of Materialism have now dominated 
the scene, i.e. non-reductive reductionisms. This sounds puzzling, but 
"reduction" has to be understood in a different sense in the two compo-
nents. "Non-reductive" means that the theory does not imply defin-
ability. The sense in which it is still reductionist is less clear. In one 
version non-reductive Materialism says that there is a relation between 
non-physical and physical properties - supervenience - that does not 
imply reduction as definability, but nevertheless supports a materialist 
conception of reality. In another version it says that all events are 
identical with physical events. 2 This claim, however, makes sense only 
with respect to a theory of events, and since I am not satisfied with 
present theories I shall be concerned only with the first version of non-
reductive Materialism in this paper. The central question will be: Is 
supervenience really a sufficient basis for Materialism? Since different 
concepts of supervenience have been discussed in the literature and 
their properties and relations are not always correctly understood, we 
first have to tackle conceptual matters. 
1. C O N C F P T S O F S l l M R Y F N I F N ( F 
Let F and G be families of properties defined on a common domain D 
of objects, and let / , / ' , . . . be elements of F, . . . those of G and 
v, v, . . . those of D . Then a first concept of supervenience is defined 
by: 
D l : F is supervenient on G iff A.YV(A#(#.Y = #y) D A / ( / v = ,/y)), 
i.e. iff there is no difference in F-properties without a difference in G-
properties. As stated this is a concept of extensional supervenience 
which is of no interest for reductionistic purposes. If we put an operator 
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for necessity before the definiens we obtain a notion of nomological 
supervenience, if the operator expresses truth in all worlds in which the 
same natural laws hold as in our world, and a notion of analytical 
supervenience, if it expresses truth in all possible worlds. Since super-
venience is usually taken as logically contingent, nomological or, as it 
is mostly called: weak supervenience (WS), is the most interesting case 
for our discussion. 
Supervenience is often equated with inferentiality: 
D2: F is inferential with respect to G iff Axf(fx D Vg(gx A 
Ay(gyDfy))), 
i.e. iff an object has property / only in virtue of having property g, 
which is a sufficient general criterion for being / . Inferentiality implies 
supervenience, but we can only say: If F is supervenient on G then F 
is inferential with respect to G + , where G+ is the smallest complete 
Boolean algebra containing G , i.e. G+ is the smallest set of properties 
containing G closed with respect to negation and finite as well as infinite 
conjunctions. Supervenience, therefore, is equivalent with inferentiality 
only if G = G + . 3 In this case WS is equivalent to nomological inferen-
tiality, defined by putting an operator N for nomological necessity 
before the definiens in D2 . 
Given G = G+ WS is also equivalent with AfNVgAx(fx = gx). This 
is essentially weaker than AJVgNAx(fx = gx). A n d that is what - for 
G = G+ - strong supervenience (SS) amounts to: 4 
D3: F is strongly supervenient on G iff N\xf(fx D 
Vg(gxNAy(gyDfy))). 
Here, against nomological inferentiality, there is a cross-world connec-
tion between the properties g and / , so that being g is a criterion fof 
being / i n the strong sense that, if an object y were a g, it would also 
be an / . SS, then, implies W S , but the converse does not hold. 
A third concept of supervenience is that of global supervenience 
( G S ) . 5 Let vv, w' be nomologically possible worlds as seen from the 
standpoint of our world and fHx be the proposition that property / 
applies to x in world w. Then G S is defined by: 
D4: F is globally supervenient on G iff 
Aww'(\gx(gu.x = gu,x) D \fx(fiyx=fn,x)). 
That is: Worlds that are alike with respect to the distribution of G-
properties are also alike with respect to the distribution of F-properties. 
D4 can be extended to a notion of supervenience of propositions (or 
states of affairs): If W is the set of all possible worlds, not just the 
nomologically possible ones, and X and Y are sets of propositions p 
and q, respectively, i.e. sets of subsets of W, we say: A' i s P-supervenient 
on Y iff Aww'(Ap(w E p = w' E p) D Aq(w E q = w' E q))6 If X is the 
smallest complete Boolean algebra containing the propositions that fx 
for all / E F and x E D , and likewise for Y and G , then G S of F on G 
is equivalent with P-supervenience of X on Y for G = G + and F = F^. 
SS implies G S , but the converse does not hold. GS does not imply 
WS, and WS not G S . 
WS, SS and G S are the three most important concepts of superveni-
ence in the current discussion, but they are not the only possible ones, 
of course. A definition of supervenience concepts for attributes (re-
lations besides properties) instead of just properties is not essentially 
more general. For if F and G are families of attributes defined on D 
supervenience of F on G is supervenience of the set of properties 
definable from F by substitution on the set of properties so definable 
from G . But since we have: 
WS: Awxy(Ag(g„x - gwy) D Af(flx.x=fwy)) 
GS: Aww' (Agx(gn,x = gH,x) D Afx(fwx = fxx,x)) 
SS: Aww'xy(Ag(giXx - glx,y) D Af(fn.x = flx..y)) (for G = G+) , 7 
it is natural to add 
LS: Aww'x(Ag(g».x = gl%,x) D Af(flxx=flx,x)) 
to this list. Let us call this local supervenience * LS says: If an object JC 
has the same G-properties in two nomologically possible worlds, it also 
has the same F-properties in these worlds, i.e. no change in F-properties 
without a change in G-properties. Since L S , for G = G + , is equivalent 
with A / x V g N (fx = gx) it also states cross-world correspondences like 
SS, though not universal ones. Clearly LS implies G S , and is implied 
by SS. But it neither implies W S , nor is it implied by WS. 
The relations between these different supervenience concepts depend 
on the families F and G . If, for instance, G contains for all g E G and 
x E D the property gx(y) = y = y A g(x), i.e. the property applying to 
any y iff g applies to x, G S of F on G implies LS of F on G , and GS 
and WS imply SS . 9 
A s usual I have defined all supervenience concepts as relations be-
tween properties (or propositions). They can, of course, also be formu-
lated for predicates (or sentences), but it is more convenient to abstract 
from the structure of languages. Definability and reducibility, on the 
other hand, are essentially linguistic relations. Let F and G now be 
disjunct sets of one-place predicate constants of a language L. Then F 
is definable from G in L iff for all / E F there is a predicate A[x] in L , 
containing only predicate constants from G , such that A.v(/v = A[x]) is 
true in L. F is analytically (nomologically) definable from G , if this 
equivalence is an analytical (nomological) truth. Clearly nomological 
definability of Ff rom G implies SS of the set F' of properties expressed 
hy the predicates of F on G ' , the set of properties expressed by the 
predicates from G . The converse, however, is not true, even though we 
have A/VgNA.v( /v = gx) for G ' = G ' \ For a n / E F' the corresponding 
property g from G ' is constructed as follows: Let g\ be the (infinite) 
conjunction of all g' such that g,[x. Then g is the (infinite) disjunction 
of all the g , l v such that j\sx. Here g is defined by / , so that / cannot in 
turn be defined by g, and, furthermore, in L we generally don't have 
the means to build infinite conjunctions of arbitrary sets of predicates, 
i.e. sets also for which there is no defining predicate in L. So Kim's 
suggestions notwithstanding, 1" even SS, the strongest form of super-
venience here considered, does not imply definability and does not 
even come "close to it" or shows that it is "possible in principle". 
Reducibility is mostly understood as implying nomological defin-
ability. A wider notion of reducibility does not presuppose an identity 
of the predicate domains. If S{ and S2 are two languages of the same 
logical type (languages of first order predicate logic, e.g.) with the 
interpretations ,/j =\\V, /?, D , , Vx) and J2 = (W.R.D2* V2) (W is the 
set of possible worlds, R a relation of nomological accessibility on W. 
Dx and D2 are the universes of discourse and K , , V2 interpretation 
functions), then in n,, S\ is nomologically reducible to S2 iff adding the 
constants of S, to S2 there are explicit definitions D for them in S2> 
such that for the extension J2/) of : / 2 satisfying D we have V2/)is(A) = 
V[u (A) for all vv such that u' n/?u\ Reducibility in this sense implies P-
supervcnience of the propositions expressible in S\ on those expressible 
in S2, but again the converse does not hold. 
Supervenience then, even in the strongest form here considered does 
not imply reducibility. The assumption of a supervenience of the non-
physical on the physical, therefore is indeed non-reductive. But is it a 
materialist conception? A s a first step let us consider the plausibility of 
supervenience claims. 
2. T H E P L A U S I B I L I T Y O F U N I V E R S A L S U P E R V E N I E N C E 
A S S U M P T I O N S 
Hitherto I have considered supervenience theses as statements about 
nomological necessities. A s such they would be empirical. Mostly, how-
ever, they are seen as metaphysical assumptions, and that, in the case 
of Materialism as a claim of the supervenience of all properties defined 
for empirical objects on physical ones, seems much more appropriate. 
In fact I think that some of these claims have a high apriori plausibility, 
but that this is a good argument against classifying them as genuine 
materialist positions. 
Let F now be the set of all properties, while G , as before, is the set 
of all physical properties. Then WS of F on G says: 
(1) NA.vy( Ag(gx - gy) D \f( fx =fy)). 
According to Leibniz's principle 
(LI) • \xy(\f(fx=fy)Dx = y) 
( • stands for analytic necessity) this implies 
(PI) N\xy (Ag(gx = gy) D x = y). 
(PI) says that for all empirical objects there are sufficient physical 
criteria of identity. This even a dualist will not doubt, if he does not 
assume a Cartesian Dualism of substances and envisages no unem-
bodied spirits. For him it are persons, who have mental properties and 
for their identity being in the same place at the same time is sufficient. 
Since (1) follows from (PI) by the principle of substitutivity of identi-
cals, the inverse of (L I ) , he will also accept a WS of all properties, 
especially psychological properties, on physical ones. 
It has often been said that in cases where (PI) holds a WS on G is 
trivial and that an interesting ontological position would result only if 
(PI) is not true. But a universal WS of all properties on physical ones 
does imply (PI), and it is only plausible in view of this principle. 
Now in (PI) the operator N can also be understood as a metaphysical 
necessity since it expresses our conception of empirical objects, which 
is independent of our assumption of specific natural laws: Empirical 
objects always have physical properties and can be identified by them. 
But then (1) is not just a nomological truth either, but has the same 
status as (PI) . 
The case of G S is not quite as simple. It says 
(2) Aww'(Agx(gu.x = glx,x) D A / v ( / u A - / H , v ) ) . 
Here we can use the principle: 
(L2) Aww'(Afx(fx%.x=fxx,x) D w = w'). 
It says that in different worlds at least one object must have at least 
one different property, which is highly plausible. For in what sense 
should the worlds be different otherwise? With (L2) we obtain from 
(2): 
(P2) Aww' (Agx(glxx* = gxx.>x) D w = w'). 
That is: Worlds in which all objects have exactly the same physical 
properties are identical. This again might be accepted also by a dualist 
of non-Cartesian profession. First, (P2) does not imply that changes in 
the mental states of a person are always connected with neurological 
changes in his brains, but only that these psychological changes are 
accompanied by some physical changes somewhere in the universe, 
and this is an extremely weak assumption. Second, the dualist may 
acknowledge that for worlds there are sufficient physical criteria of 
identity as there are for persons. Since (2) is again a logical consequence 
of (P2), he will then also accept (2). However, he might also argue that 
the assumption that changes in our beliefs about physical objects are 
always accompanied by changes in them implies implausible restrictions 
as to what we can know about them. 
Things are still more problematic in the case of SS. It says 
(3) Aww'xy(Ag(gxxx - glx,y) D Af(fH.x^J\x.y)). 
Here we could postulate 
(L3) Aww'xy(Af(fwx=flx,y) D w = w'). 
That is: Two objects never have exactly the same properties in different 
worlds. This, however, is only plausible if we consider not just intrinsic^ 
but also extrinsical, i.e. relational properties belonging to an object 
only in virtue of its relations to other objects with certain properties, 
like being taller than John Jones. The properties f \ that apply to every 
object v just in case / applies to x are such relational properties. If for 
all x G D and/€= F f is in F, Af(fH.x = f^y) implies Afx(fxxx = 
so that (L3) is a consequence of (L2). From (L3) and (3) we obtain 
(P3) Aww' xy(Ag(gxvx = g, v y) 3 w — w'), 
i.e. worlds in which two objects have exactly the same physical proper-
ties are identical. Here (3) is not a consequence of (P3), however, since 
the inverse of (L3) would imply that in all worlds there is just one 
object. But (P3) entails that SS is a consequence of WS. 
Now (L3) and (P3) are highly problematic. But a supervenience that 
would hold only for intrinsic properties would certainly be too weak 
for Materialism. There are non-physical properties like being money 
that certainly do not correspond to intrinsical physical ones. 1 1 If we 
admit relational properties however, it will be hard to exclude proper-
ties like / V 2 But suppose this problem is solved. Then SS would be 
the best candidate for a distinctive materialist conception of reality. To 
be a successful candidate, however, it should also imply a dependence 
of all psychological states on physical ones. 
3. S U P E R V E N I E N C E A N D D E P E N D E N C E 
Supervenience is often seen as a relation of dependence or determina-
tion. Now a dependence of all psychological on physical states or events 
is something a dualist has to deny, if he doesn't want to water down 
his position too much. So we have to check whether supervenience 
indeed implies dependence. 
First, however, two remarks. Dependence is an asymmetric relation. 
But F's supervenience on G does not preclude Gs supervenience on 
F - every property is supervenient on itself, e.g. Therefore we consider 
only cases, in which an inverse supervenience is excluded. F, then, 
cannot now be a set including G , as in the last section. We will now 
take F to be the set of mental properties. Dependence, furthermore, 
in the context of metaphysical claims has to be understood as a relation 
between a fact and its ratio essendi, i.e. its cause. The materialist does 
not deny that psychological states may be symptoms and therefore 
rationes cognoscendi of brain states, but he maintains that brain states 
are the causes of mental states - if he doesn't, like D . Davidson, 
conceive of them as identical. 
Now the supervenience concepts here discussed contain no element 
that justifies an understanding as dependence relations. A n extensional 
supervenience of F on G means just that the most specific partition of 
D-objects by G-properties is a (proper or improper) subclassification 
of every partition by F-properties. Truth, to use an example of David-
son, is defined for sentences. That is, (eternal) sentences with different 
truth values must be syntactically different. Here we even have an 
analytical supervenience, but nobody would say that the truth of a 
sentence depended on its syntactical properties, that they of themselves 
made a sentence true or false. What makes a sentence true is rather 
the meaning we attach to it together with the facts of the world. J . K i m 
has also pointed out in (1990) that, since WS correlates a p roper ty / to 
a property g only in one world, we cannot say that if x were g it would 
be / . A s this is a minimum requirement for causal dependence, he 
advocates SS instead of WS as a materialist thesis. Let us then take 
this strongest form of supervenience. The argument that it implies a 
dependence of the distribution of F-properties on that of G-properties 
is just that it fulfills the minimum requirement: For every / there is a 
g such that N A J C ( / V = gx), if G = G + , and therefore we can say: If x 
would (not) have had the property g it would (not) have been an / . GS 
for K i m is too weak as a materialist position, since it does not imply a 
connection between the physical and the non-physical states of one and 
the same object. The minimum requirement is not sufficient for causal 
dependence, however. NAx(fx = gx) does not say that being /depends 
on being g; it may well be the other way round. Having g can also be 
a symptom of having / , one that occurs only in cases of / . A n d 
N A J C ( / * = gx) may also obtain if fx and gx have a common cause. 1 3 A 
cause, furthermore, precedes its effect, while supervenience relations 
correlate coinciding events. Finally, by the nomological conception of 
causality, ga is only a cause of fa, if there is a law under which both 
events may be subsumed. But in view of the construction of g 
N A x ( g x D / x ) will not in general be a lawlike sentence; there may be 
no predicate expressing g. Therefore SS neither implies that mental 
phenomena can be physically explained - even if we assume that some 
day all physical phenomena are amenable to explanation. What is 
needed for a derivation of a sentence "/*" about a mental property of 
some person x from sentences about physical laws and conditions is not 
just that for / there is a property g such that N A J C ( / J C = gx), but that 
there is a predicate for this g. If there is such a predicate we could 
define / by it. But SS does not imply definability.14 
Dualism maintains: Neither can the mental be reduced to the physi-
cal, nor the physical to the mental. According to the sense in which 
"reduced" is understood different dualistic theses can be distinguished. 
If reduction is taken in the sense of analytical or nomological defin-
ability or nomological reducibility in the sense explained at the end of 
Section 1, forms of Dualism emerge that would be accepted by non-
reductive Materialism. For non-Cartesian dualists conflict will also not 
arise if reducibility is taken as supervenience. To be sure, since a 
supervenience of the physical on the mental is not at all plausible, 
the dualist can no longer keep up his symmetrical attitude towards 
Materialism and Idealism, but this for him is not really important.15 
What he has to defend against materialism is that mental phenomena 
- or at least some of them - are phenomena in their own right. In one 
sense this is true already if logical physicalism is wrong, as everyone 
admits nowadays. Mental phenomena are phenomena described in 
psychological terms and if these descriptions cannot be translated into 
the language of physics, they are beyond what physics can ascertain or 
explain. In another sense, however, mental phenomena are phenomena 
in their own right only if they are not wholly dependent on physical 
events. But since supervenience relations do not imply such a depen-
dence, they pose no problem for a dualist. He may accept them and 
still argue that materialism is false. And that means that supervenience 
is inadequate for a formation of materialism. To borrow an expression 
from Kim in (1990): Supervenience is only a relation of covariance, not 
of dependence. 
An argument for a one-sided causal dependence of mental on physical 
events has to proceed from other premisses, therefore. Physicalists -
in contradistinction to physicists - generally believe that the physical 
is causally closed. This assumption, however, is not an argument for, 
but against a causal dependence of the mental on the physical. It 
precludes not only non-physical causes of physical events but also non-
physical effects of physical events. Physical causation implies a transfer 
of energy, and a closed system preserves its energy. The consequence 
would then be Parallellism: The nomological correlation between men-
tal and physical events would be correspondences between causally 
disjunct systems as in Leibniz's example of the two clocks that, once 
set aright, independently always show the same time. 
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